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ARGUMENT 
I. THERE ARE DISPUTED EVIDENTIARY MATTERS NECESSARY FOR A TRIER 
OF FACT REGARDING SMITH'S CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE. 
It must be remembered that, "[i]t is inappropriate for courts to weigh disputed material 
facts in ruling on a summary judgment. It matters not that the evidence on one side may appear 
to be strong or even compelling. One sworn statement under oath is all that is needed to dispute 
the averments on the other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact, precluding the 
entry of summary judgment." Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) (citations omitted). 
Smith's raises issue with two important issues of fact: (1) the source of the water, and (2) 
how long the spill had been on the floor prior to Mrs. Price's fall. 
One compelling statement made under oath by Smith's store manager was that "I am 
almost 100 percent sure [the water] came from . . . I am sure that that water belonged to 
[Pyggy]." R. 298. 
Mr. Brown's sworn statement goes well beyond "speculation and conjecture" to establish 
the source of the water. 
Precluding a jury from deciding the sufficiency of the time elapsed between the cleanup 
of Pyggy's workstation and the injury, as would be necessary to show constructive knowledge, is 
precisely the type of issue of material fact that is outside of the prerogative of the District Court 
to decide. Specifically, "if there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the 
doubt should be resolved in favor of the opposing party.11 Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 
436 (Utah 1982). Smith's store manager has already established in deposition that 
approximately ten minutes passed from the time of the alleged spill to the time of the injury. R. 
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278. However, it remains a stark issue of material fact as to whether that time frame is accurate, 
and whether such time created constructive knowledge for a reasonable time for Smith's to 
remedy the dangerous condition. 
Construing the facts most favorably to Mrs. Price would entitle her to go forward. 
Contrary to the findings of the Trial Court, significant evidence was presented which requires a 
trier of fact to determine whether or not such an amount of time passing between the alleged spill 
and the injury was reasonable for the Defendant to create constructive knowledge and remedy 
the hazard, thus precluding Summary Judgment from being rendered. Again, only some 
evidence of the length of time the problem existed is required. Ohlson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 
568 P.2d 753 (Utah 1977) (where the court found the Plaintiff produced evidence of the length of 
time the problem existed by merely discussing the condition of the broken spaghetti that caused 
the Plaintiff to fall). 
Here, Pyggy took down its demonstration table at 4:40 p.m., and left the store by 5:00 
p.m. R. 177. Shortly after 5:00 p.m. Judy Price went with her granddaughter to buy 
strawberries. R. 250, 303. Mrs. Price thinks the accident happened after 5:00, around 5:20. Mr. 
Brown thought the water was on the floor for maybe ten minutes. R. 278, 301. 
The conflicting evidence as to the time elapsed between the spill and the fall is the 
precise issue of material fact that requires weighing by a jury. 
In addition, the amount of time the problem existed for the first prong of the Allen test 
should be irrelevant. Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975). In order 
to prove constructive notice Allen requires (1) that the condition existed long enough that 
defendant should have discovered it, and (2) that after such constructive knowledge, sufficient 
time elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care the defendant should have remedied it. Id. 
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Mrs. Price's theory of duty and breach is that Smith's should have checked Pyggy's 
demonstration area at the moment Pyggy checked out of the store, which they admittedly did not 
do. Kent Steele, previously a Health and Safety Manager for 1300 Safeway stores, stated that 
demonstrator areas are typical areas to anticipate spillage and that Smith's conduct fell below the 
standard of care by not providing a clean area upon the demonstrator's departure from the store. 
R. 253-256. Smith's admittedly did not check that area of the store upon the demonstrators' 
departure. R. 280, 295, 299, & 359. Thus, the first prong of Allen should be irrelevant—the 
condition existed long enough that the defendant should have discovered it. Further, it is clear 
that Smith's did not clean up the mess in a reasonable time. Mr. Brown testified that the mess 
was cleaned up quickly with paper towels. R. 278-279 at p. 47. It certainly wouldn't have taken 
ten minutes to gather paper towels and wipe up a small water spot. Therefore, Mrs. Price can 
meet the second element of Allen— that after such constructive knowledge, sufficient time 
elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care the defendant should have remedied the problem. 
Mrs. Price has met both elements of the Allen test and this matter should be remanded to 
the trial court. Yet, if Mrs. Price has not met the first element of the Allen test it should be 
irrelevant because Smith's should have had constructive notice, by not exercising reasonable 
care, when they failed to check the demonstrator's area when Pyggy checked out. 
II. SMITH'S SHOULD BE VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR PYGGY'S NEGLIGENCE 
Because Pyggy failed in its obligation to maintain the area of the Smith's store where it 
demonstrated products, Smith's should be vicariously liable for the harm that resulted from 
Pyggy's failure to use reasonable care. 
The actual or constructive notice test would not apply to Pyggy's negligence because 
Pyggy created the dangerous condition. "[I]f the condition.. .was created by the defendant.. .the 
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notice requirement does not apply." Jex v. JRA, Inc., 166 P.3d 655, 658 (Utah Ct. App. 2007), 
quoting Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah Ct App. 1991). Silcox held 
that it is for the jury to decide whether one of defendant's employees created the risk of harm, or 
whether a phantom shopper created the spill, regardless of whether the store was on notice of the 
spill. Id at p. 625. Thus, Pyggy can be negligent, regardless of actual or constructive notice, if 
they created the dangerous condition. 
It was previously undisputed that Pyggy created the spill. R. 150 & 260. Smith's 
answered an interrogatory stating that "[t]he water on the store's floor came from a cup of water 
that Stephen Tyler, an employee of independent contractor [Pyggy] spilled and failed to clean up 
before leaving the store premises shortly before Plaintiffs alleged accident." R. 260. 
Therefore, it was undisputed that Pyggy created the water spill and that they failed to clean it up. 
The question then becomes whether Smith's can be vicariously liable for Pyggy's 
negligence. Section II of Mrs. Price's Appellate brief discusses the question of whether Smith's 
can be liable for Pyggy's actions. See Judy Price's Appellate Brief at pp.12-16. Smith's raised 
two arguments in response to this issue. First, it is important to note that Smith's did not deny 
that the law should recognize liability for independent contractors where a "non-delegable duty" 
or "absolute duty" exists. In addition, they did not dispute that a non-delegable or absolute duty 
exists here. 
The issues raised by Smith's are that (1) there is no evidence that Smith's ever delegated 
its duty to maintain its store in a reasonably safe condition to Pyggy, (2) that there is no evidence 
Pyggy was an independent contractor retained by Smith's to maintain Smith's premises, and (3) 
that there is no evidence that the demonstrator was the origin of the water spill. See Smith's 
Appellate brief at p. 11. 
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Did Smith's delegate its duty to maintain its store in a reasonable safe condition? Pyggy 
was abiding by "store policy" by being responsible for cleaning the floor of the demonstration 
area. R. 281 at p.22. See also R. 283 at p. 15 (where Smith's store manager said that Smith's 
doesn't oversee the operation of the demonstrators because the demonstrators are on their own), 
R. 281 p. 23 (where the demonstrators bring their own cleaning supplies). Thus, Smith's 
delegated its duty to maintain the area of the fall to Pyggy. 
Is there evidence that Pyggy was an (a) independent contractor (b) retained by Smith's to 
maintain Smith's premises? Smith's answered an interrogatory explaining that the water came 
from the "independent contractor" Pyggy. R. 260. Smith's motion for summary judgment also 
termed Pyggy as an independent contractor. R. 246. Next, Smith's improperly frames the issue 
regarding maintenance to require that the independent contractor be "retained." The occupier 
will be liable for the negligence of an independent contractor to whom he entrusts maintenance 
and repair." Handbook of Law of Torts § 61 (4 ed. 1971). There is no requirement that the 
independent contractor be retained. Id. In addition, in a case very similar to this matter, the 
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court was careful to point out that the exact nature of the relationship between the store and the 
food demonstrator was unimportant because the store, like Smith's here, stood to gain from the 
demonstrator's activities. Little v. Butner, 348 P.2d 1022, 1032 (Kan. 1960). 
Is there evidence that the demonstrator was the origin of the water spill? On numerous 
occasions Smith's admitted that Pyggy was the source of the water spill. R. 260 (in Smith's 
answers to Mrs. Price's interrogatories Smith's stated that the water on the floor came from a cup 
of water that Pyggy spilled and failed to clean up), R. 278-279 at p.44-45 (where Smith's store 
manager stated that he was almost 100 percent sure the water came from Pyggy). Please note 
that although pages 44 and 45 of Mr. Brown's deposition were included in Mrs. Price's response 
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to Smith's motion for summary judgment those pages were somehow skipped when the record 
was paginated for appeal Smith's now seeks to back off its prior answers to interrogatories and 
responses to deposition questions to muddy the waters regarding the source of the water. Clearly 
there is evidence that Pyggy was the source of the water. 
Smith's also argues that holding Smith's liable in this case would create a strict liability 
standard for stores for any problems that arise inside a store. Defendant's conclusion is 
incorrect. Every plaintiff would still be required to prove negligence on the part of the 
independent contractor in the independent contractor's maintenance of an absolute or non-
delegable duty in order to prove his/her claim. Stores cannot be vicariously liable for the 
negligence of their independent contractors if their independent contractors are not negligent. 
In summary, there is convincing evidence that Pyggy was the source of the water spill, 
and that Pyggy was an independent contractor to whom Smith's delegated the duty of 
maintenance. For those reasons, Smith's should be vicariously liable for Pyggy's negligence. 
III. SMITH'S REGULAR FLOOR INSPECTIONS ARE IRRELEVANT BECAUSE 
SMITH'S SHOULD HAVE CHECKED THE DEMONSTRATOR AREA WHEN PYGGY 
CHECKED OUT. 
Again, Mrs. Price's theory of duty and breach is that Smith's should have checked 
Pyggy's demonstration area when Pyggy checked out of the store, which they admittedly did not 
do. R. 280, 295, 299, & 359. Smith's has argued that it simply could not be negligent because it 
conducted twelve formal floor inspections between 4:24 p.m. and 5:59 p.m. Smith's Appellate 
Brief at p. 11. First, Mrs. Price's theory of negligence is that if Smith's would have checked the 
area of the store where Pyggy had been when the demonstrator checked out then Mrs. Price's fall 
would not have occurred, regardless of who created the water spill. Kent Steele, previously a 
Health and Safety Manager for 1300 Safeway stores, stated that demonstrator areas are typical 
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areas to anticipate spillage and that Smith's conduct fell below the standard of care by not 
providing a clean area upon the demonstrator's departure from the store. R. 253-256. Thus, the 
number of regular floor inspections is irrelevant to Mrs. Price's theory of duty and breach. 
Second, it is somewhat troubling that Smith's claims it inspected a nearly 80,000 square 
foot store eight times in a thirty-four minute period. R. 278-79, at p.46 (stating that the store is 
nearly 80,000 square feet). This highlights the need for a jury to determine the reasonableness of 
Smith's assertions. 
Nevertheless, the alleged number of inspections should not protect Smith's from their 
breach of reasonable care in this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Price respectfully requests that the Court reverse the District Court's ruling granting 
Smith's Motion for Summary Judgment. Mrs. Price has produced evidence of the amount of 
time the water was on the floor sufficient to survive summary judgment. In addition, Smith's 
should be vicariously liable for Pyggy's actions. Mrs. Price respectfully requests that the Court 
remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings. 
Tyler S.Young (11325) 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
75 South 300 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
801-379-0700 
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